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System for Belgium 
Kim De Witte
University of Leuven
This chapter discusses the ideal pension system for Belgium. Cur-
rently, the Belgian pension system is a subject of debate. Political and 
social actors have proposed substantial reforms. To get a good picture 
of the necessary reforms, value judgments and technical analyses have 
to be taken into account. Sometimes deep changes in the pension sys-
tem are advocated as if they were technically unavoidable, but this is 
obviously wrong. Not only are there different reform options available, 
the choice between them is based on ideological background and value 
judgments. In this chapter, I develop a clear set of evaluation criteria for 
pension reforms. The main reform proposals are then evaluated in the 
light of these criteria. 
First, I give an overview of the Belgian pension system. The struc-
ture, adequacy, and fi nancing of the different types of pension plans 
are explained. Then I present the pension reform proposals of the main 
social and political actors in Belgium, where there is a consensus with 
respect to the necessity of a pension reform but no consensus with re-
spect to concrete reform proposals. After evaluating the various pension 
reform proposals, I present my personal vision on the ideal pension 
system for Belgium.
OVERVIEW OF THE BELGIAN PENSION SYSTEM
In this fi rst section, the structure, adequacy, and fi nancing of the 
Belgian pension system are presented. The Belgian pension system 
consists mainly of statutory pension plans, supplemented by occupa-
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tional and individual pension plans. This is a variant of the well-known 
three-pillar model. The statutory pension plans are pay-as-you-go de-
fi ned benefi t arrangements, the occupational pension plans are funded 
defi ned benefi t or defi ned contribution arrangements, and the individual 
pension plans are funded defi ned contribution arrangements. 
Structure of the Belgian Pension System
Statutory pension plans
In Belgium, employees (both public and private), self-employed 
workers, and civil servants (a special class of public employee in Bel-
gium) are compulsorily insured under three different statutory pension 
plans.
Pension plan for employees. The statutory old-age pension for 
employees depends on annual earnings, length of career, and marital 
status. The formula for the pension accrual of employees in a given 
year is as follows: the pension accrual for year X is the wage of year X 
(capped) divided by 45 (the length of a full career) and multiplied by 
either 60 percent or 75 percent. The wage of year X is the gross sal-
ary during that year up to a certain ceiling (€47,282 in 2009, adjusted 
annually to current prices). The pension is computed as 60 percent of 
the capped wage for a single person or 75 percent for the head of a 
household (persons with a dependent spouse). At retirement, a statu-
tory pension is paid as an annuity equal to the result of this formula.1 
Pension coverage is continued during unemployment or other forms of 
involuntary inactivity (illness, pregnancy, disability, etc.). These peri-
ods of inactivity are valued at the last corresponding salary. To claim 
an old-age pension, an employee must have reached the age of 65 and 
stopped working.2 Pensions are paid monthly by direct deposit into the 
pensioner’s bank account. Pension benefi ts are automatically adjusted 
to a price index and partially adjusted to average wage increases.
Pension plan for the self-employed. The statutory pension plan 
for the self-employed is similar to the employee plan, except for a re-
duction coeffi cient. The reduction coeffi cient refl ects the discrepancy 
between the contributions paid by employees and by self-employed 
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workers. Because there were no social security contributions by the 
self-employed prior to 1984, statutory pension rights were calculated 
based on a fi xed income. The formula for the old-age pension accrual 
for self-employed individuals is basically the same as the employee 
plan except the amount is also multiplied by the reduction coeffi cient. 
There are also some other minor differences with respect to the em-
ployee plan.3
Pension plan for civil servants. The formula for determining the 
old-age and disability pensions for civil servants is different. The pen-
sion is equal to the average wage of the last 5 years multiplied by the 
length of the career (maximum of 45 years) divided by 60 (the retire-
ment factor). To receive a pension benefi t, a civil service career of at 
least 5 years is required.4 At the maximum career length of 45 years, a 
replacement rate of 75 percent of the average wage of the last 5 years 
is obtained. Some occupations have a preferential retirement factor (55 
for teachers and less for other specifi c categories such as magistrates 
and academic services). People in these areas therefore reach the maxi-
mum replacement rate of 75 percent in less than 45 years.
With some exceptions, the legal retirement age is 65 for men and 
women, and retirement with pension benefi ts is possible from the age 
of 60. The pension benefi t is biannually adjusted to the consumer price 
index (CPI) and to the real wage increase of working civil servants. To 
benefi t from a minimum pension, a career of 20 years is required. In ad-
dition, the survivor’s pension is calculated as 60 percent of the average 
wage of the last 5 years of the deceased person.
Early retirement pension. An early retirement plan (the so-called 
prepension) is embedded in the unemployment plan, but only for em-
ployees. The full prepension consists of an unemployment benefi t, paid 
by the public authorities (the National Employment Offi ce), which 
amounts to 60 percent of the last gross wage earned, limited by a ceiling, 
which is different from that used in the pension plan. The benefi ciaries 
also receive an allowance, paid by the employer. Since 2008, the legal 
age to receive the prepension is 60, provided the career length as an 
employee was at least 30 years for men (35 years as of 2012) and 26 
years for women (after 2008, this age increases by 2 years every 4 years 
until it reaches 35 years). Exemptions (for those who have reached at 
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least age 58) are still possible for those who have worked in physically 
demanding jobs. The prepension benefi t is automatically adjusted to the 
CPI and partially adjusted to average wage increases.
Disability. If a person’s disability prevents him or her from working 
for more than one year, a disability benefi t is paid. In the employee plan, 
disability benefi ts are calculated at 65 percent of the limited lost remu-
neration for benefi ciaries who are a head of a household, 53 percent for 
single persons, and 40 percent for cohabitants. In the self-employed 
workers’ plan, the disability benefi ts are fi xed but differ according to 
whether the benefi ciary is a head of household. The disability benefi t 
is automatically adjusted to the CPI and partially adjusted to average 
wage increases.
Guaranteed income for elders. Every person 65 or older whose 
pension plus other income is below a certain threshold is entitled to a 
means-tested guaranteed income for the elderly (GIE). In 2009, the GIE 
was €892.92 per month for a single person and €595.33 per month for 
cohabitants (for each person). The GIE benefi t is automatically adjusted 
to the CPI and partially adjusted to average wage increases.
Occupational pension plans
In general, occupational pensions in Belgium are not mandatory, 
and only a few branches of industry have a mandatory occupational 
pension plan. The occupational pension must be externally funded by 
either group insurance companies or pension funds.5 About 70 percent 
of pension plan members are covered under an insurance contract. 
Hence, the Belgian occupational pension landscape is dominated by 
insurance companies. 
Legal framework. The legal framework for occupational pension 
plans was implemented at the beginning of 2004. The “Vandenbroucke 
Law” was enacted in 2003 to strengthen occupational pensions and 
regulate industry-wide pension plans. It covers occupational pensions, 
a tax plan for those pensions, and some related social security benefi ts. 
Industry-wide pensions. Industry-wide pension plans are the re-
sult of collective bargaining agreements between social partners, for 
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example, employer associations and trade unions.6 Employers of a 
given branch of industry are obliged to join the industry-wide plan, un-
less the collective bargaining agreement allows them to opt out of the 
plan. Opting out is only possible if the employer offers an occupational 
pension plan at the company level providing benefi ts equivalent to the 
industry-wide plan. 
Tax treatment. Belgium has enacted tax legislation improving 
the tax-exempt status of occupational pension contributions. The tax 
treatment of occupational pensions is based on the so-called exempt-
exempt-taxed system, meaning that contributions and investment 
earnings are almost exempt from taxes, but benefi t payments are taxed. 
However, instead of the normal social security tax of approximately 35 
percent of gross salary, a special social security tax of 8.86 percent and 
an insurance tax of 4.4 percent are imposed on contributions to occupa-
tional pension plans. 
For the employer, contributions to occupational pension plans are 
tax-deductible to a certain amount. This deductibility is linked to the 
condition that the expected sum of statutory and occupational pensions 
does not exceed 80 percent of gross salary in the given year. For the 
employee, contributions to occupational pensions are not part of the 
employees’ taxable income. Income tax is only paid on the benefi ts re-
ceived at retirement. If the benefi t is paid as a lump sum, it is subject 
to a fl at-rate tax (10 or 16 percent). If the benefi t is paid as an annuity, 
the annuity is taxed as normal income, but the actual tax is lowered by 
a special tax credit for retirees.
Social plans. So-called social plans can be set up, either at the com-
pany or the industry level. Contrary to ordinary occupational pension 
plans, social plans are required to offer benefi ts for risks such as death, 
disability, or unemployment. In order to fi nance these risks, part of the 
contributions must be allocated in a “solidarity” fund. These so-called 
solidarity payments have to amount to at least 4.4 percent of contri-
butions. Other requirements include joint management, cost reduction, 
and profi t sharing. Social plans are encouraged through special tax ad-
vantages, such as relief from the 4.4 percent insurance tax. 
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Guaranteed investment return. From 2004 onward, Belgium has 
required a minimum rate of return guarantee for defi ned contribution 
pensions. The minimum guaranteed rate is 3.25 percent for contributions 
by employers and 3.75 percent for contributions paid by employees. 
These rates are considered to be set for an indefi nite period, presumably 
lasting many years. If the employment contract ends, the employee can 
transfer his accrued reserves either to the occupational pension plan of 
his new employer or to a freely chosen insurance company. He can also 
opt for a further accrual within the occupational pension plan of his for-
mer employer. If the employee decides to leave the plan, the company 
is responsible for complying with the guaranteed investment return. If 
there is an accrual defi cit, the gap has to be bridged immediately.
Minimum retirement age. A benefi ciary is prohibited from cash-
ing in accrued reserves or getting his or her benefi ts paid out before 
reaching the age of 60. Benefi ts can be paid out as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. The vast majority of occupational pensions are paid out as 
a lump sum. Therefore, indexation of occupational pension benefi ts is 
not an issue in Belgium. 
Individual pension plans
Different forms of individual voluntary pension provision exist in 
Belgium. The main forms are life insurance, pension saving, individual 
pension commitments, and voluntary pensions for the self-employed. 
The common features of these different forms are the voluntary char-
acter of participation, the contributory character of funding, and the 
management of the assets by private actors, such as insurance compa-
nies or fi nancial institutions (De Witte, Roels, and Stevens 2009).
Individual life insurance. The main characteristic of individual 
life insurance agreements is the provision of an annuity or lump sum 
payment at the moment the insured person reaches a certain age or dies. 
Individual life insurance is accessible for everybody, irrespective of pro-
fessional status. An individual life insurance agreement is fi nanced by 
premiums paid by the subscriber. The level of the premiums is agreed 
upon and stated in the insurance contract. The premiums are invested 
in insurance contracts that guarantee a capital value based on a fi xed 
interest rate. The subscriber can also choose investment in real estate 
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through a tax incentive based on a mortgage loan and debt insurance 
that is linked to the mortgage loan.
Pension saving. Pension saving is the generic term for three forms 
of tax-advantaged long-term savings that are accessible to everybody: 
1) pension saving insurance, 2) collective pension saving, and 3) in-
dividual pension saving. Pension savings are accessible to everybody. 
Pension savings accounts and individual pension savings are offered by 
fi nancial institutions (mainly banks). Contributions to pension savings 
accounts are used to buy units in investment funds. These funds are 
popular because they allow a wide choice of assets and risks. Contribu-
tions to individual pension savings are invested in shares chosen by the 
individual. 
Individual (occupational) pension commitments. Individual 
pension commitments are strictly regulated. Individual pension 
commitments are only permitted in companies that have a collec-
tive occupational pension plan for all employees. This implies that a 
commitment can only be granted in addition to such a collective oc-
cupational plan. Measures to protect employees are included, such as 
the obligation to conclude a pension agreement, to fi nance it externally 
with a pension provider, and to obtain the explicit approval of the em-
ployee for personal contributions. 
Voluntary pensions for the self-employed. A specifi c individual 
voluntary pension provision for the self-employed was introduced in 
Belgium because statutory pensions for the self-employed are low (see 
below). Voluntary pension plans for the self-employed are very similar 
to individual life insurance.
Adequacy of the Belgian Pension System
In this section, we review the adequacy of the Belgian pension sys-
tem by focusing on three aspects: 1) coverage, 2) risk sharing, and 3) 
benefi ts.
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Coverage
Statutory pension plans. In Belgium, employees, the self-
employed, and civil servants are all compulsorily covered under statu-
tory public pension plans. These plans are part of the Belgian social 
security system. The payments are deducted from the employees’ 
regular pay, and the self-employed pay obligatory contributions on a 
quarterly basis. 
Occupational pension plans. According to the most recent fi gures, 
approximately 60 percent of employees are members of an occupa-
tional pension plan. Approximately the same number of white and blue 
collar workers are members of occupational pension plans (AON Con-
sulting 2007; Assuralia 2009; Belgian Parliament 2009; de Dessus les 
Moustier and Masy 2007). The majority of occupational pension plans 
are organized at the company level, and these plans provide higher 
pension contributions than industry-wide pension plans. They involve 
primarily white collar workers and impose no solidarity mechanisms 
(Pierreux 2009). In 2009, the 27 existing industry-wide plans covered 
740,485 plan members (83 percent were men and 81 percent were 
blue collar workers, CBFA 2009). The number of industry-wide plans 
is increasing. Higher income workers benefi t more from occupational 
pensions and the tax relief they offer than lower income workers.7
Individual pension plans. According to Wuyts et al. (2007), 
participation in individual pension plans rose strongly during the last 
decade. In 2006, 37 percent of the people in Belgium between the ages 
of 15 and 64 participated in one or more individual pension plans. Un-
surprisingly, income is a very important factor for participation. The 
average income of individual pension plan members was €24,410 in 
2003. Only 9.1 percent of single people with a monthly income less 
than €750 participate in individual pension plans, whereas almost 50% 
of single people with a monthly income above €2,000 participate (De 
Witte, Roels, and Stevens 2009). Persons who participate in occupa-
tional pensions also participate markedly more frequently in individual 
pensions (Gieselink et al. 2003). Self-employed persons participate in 
and contribute more to individual pension plans, which in part could be 
due to their lower statutory pension (see below).
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Benefi ts
Statutory pension benefi ts. The GIE is €892.98 per month for 
singles and €595.33 per month for cohabitants (in 2009). Every person 
who meets the requirement of a defi ned link to Belgium and is at least 
65 years old is eligible for the GIE. The fi nancial means of an individual 
is checked, and if the individual’s total income is lower than the guaran-
teed amount, the difference is paid monthly. 
Unlike the GIE, which has no link whatsoever with the contribu-
tions paid in the past, statutory pension benefi ts for employees, the 
self-employed, and civil servants are related to contributions (up to a 
certain level). Table 7.1 presents the average monthly statutory pension 
benefi ts. 
The average statutory pension benefi t for employees is €891.42 per 
month for a single male and €631.47 per month for a single woman (as-
suming both have been employees during their entire careers). These 
benefi ts are considerably lower for the self-employed and considerably 
higher for civil servants.8 The average gross monthly wage in Belgium 
was €2,837 in 2007 (NIS 2007), so the difference between statutory 
pension benefi ts and average salary is considerable. Table 7.1 presents 















Table 7.1  Average Statutory Old-Age Pension Benefi ts and Average 
Replacement Rates (in Parentheses) for Single Persons (Gross 
Amounts, € and %)a
a National Pension Administration, monthly statistics, November 2009 (for civil 
servants: 2005).
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Occupational pension benefi ts. Occupational pension benefi ts in-
crease statutory pension income by an average of 16 percent for men 
and 13 percent for women (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010). How-
ever, this average has to be put in perspective. Amounts spent for plans 
covering the highest income workers are four to fi ve times higher than 
amounts spent for pension plans for lower income workers: 6.3 percent 
of salary is spent on the top plans, 3.4 percent on plans for white collar 
workers, and only 1.4 percent on plans for blue collar workers (AON 
Consulting 2007). Industry-wide pension plans in Belgium cover many 
employees, but the benefi ts paid out are exceedingly marginal (between 
0.75 and 1.75 percent of actual salary).10 
Individual pension benefi ts. The benefi t amounts paid out by indi-
vidual pension plans are unknown because of a lack of necessary data. 
Data concerning the accrued reserves in individual pension plans do 
exist, but they are incomplete because they do not take into account the 
investments of households in real estate, which is stimulated with the 
same tax incentives as individual life insurance plans. 
Table 7.2 presents the evolution of accrued reserves in individual 
and occupational pension plans during the last decade. For the indi-
vidual pension plans, the value of real estate accrued with tax-driven 
incentives is not taken into account. Even without taking the invest-
ments in real estate into account, the reserves of individual pension 
plans have increased greatly since 1998. These reserves have tripled, 
whereas the reserves of occupational pension plans only doubled. 
Pension reserves 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Occupational 
pensions
30 35 37 36 38 42 44 46 48 53 58
Individual 
pensions
45 53 58 62 68 80 96 116 135 142 147
Table 7.2  Evolution of Occupational and Individual Pension Reserves
(€ billion)
SOURCE: Belgian Secretary of Pensions (2010, p. 234). 
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Risk sharing
Pension accrual often takes place over a period of decades. There-
fore, risk control is a key issue. The main risks that threaten pension 
accrual are: longevity, infl ation, fi nancial, bankruptcy of the pension 
provider, and political. These risks cannot be entirely avoided, but they 
can be shared within smaller or larger groups. Four different levels of 
risk sharing can be distinguished: 1) no risk sharing (the individual plan 
or plan member bears the risk), 2) risk sharing within a company, 3) risk 
sharing within the branch of industry, and 4) nationwide risk sharing. 
An overview of the scope of risk sharing within the different forms of 
pension accrual in Belgium is presented in Table 7.3.
Risk sharing in statutory pension plans. Risk pooling in the 
statutory pension plans is based on a nationwide separation of employ-
ees, the self-employed, and civil servants (which have several different 
pools). Except for a few minor exceptions, the statutory pension plans 
are organized on a pay-as-you-go basis. The risk of infl ation and fi nan-
cial turbulence in pay-as-you-go systems is very restricted. The other 
risks are present, but they are shared within a nationwide pool. Given 
the fact that statutory pension benefi ts are required to be paid out as an-
nuities, the longevity risk is shared within each nationwide pool. The 
risk of bankruptcy of the pension provider (i.e., the Belgian state) is 
not completely unimaginable, but the risk is also shared within each 
nationwide pool. Finally, statutory pensions are subject to the risk of 
changes in pension or social security regulations (i.e., political risk).
However, retroactive changes are diffi cult to enforce, given the protec-
tion as property of state and social security pensions.
Risk sharing in occupational pension plans. The longevity risk in 
occupational pension plans is borne by the individual plan member be-
cause occupational pension benefi ts are almost always paid out as lump 
sums. The infl ation risk during the period of pension accrual is shared 
at the company level for defi ned benefi t plans and borne by the indi-
vidual plan member for defi ned contribution plans. The risk of fi nancial 
crises and bankruptcy of the pension provider are real and reside at the 
company level. Moreover, the law fi xes a minimum guaranteed return 
on occupational pension contributions. This means that the employer 
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Scope of risk sharing

































No risk sharing X X
Company X X






No risk sharing X X
Company X X
Branch of industry X X
Nationwide X X
Table 7.3  Scope of Risk Sharing within the Different Forms of Pension Accrual in Belgium
NOTE: DB = defi ned benefi t; DC = defi ned contribution.
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remains liable to the individual plan members concerning the payments 
of the pension benefi ts, including a minimum return, when the pension 
fund or insurance company fails to fulfi ll its obligations. With respect 
to the investment of pension funds, Belgium applies the prudent person 
principle, with some quantitative limits that are mainly diversifi cation 
requirements. With respect to group insurance, the reserves are invested 
in the general investment portfolio of the insurance company, and the 
insurance company determines the investment policy. The effect of po-
litical changes on occupational pension promises seems very small.
Risk sharing in individual pension plans. In individual pension 
plans, the longevity and infl ation risks are borne by the individual plan 
member. The risks of fi nancial crises and bankruptcy are shared at the 
company level. However, contrary to occupational pensions, the law 
does not require a guaranteed minimum return. The bankruptcy of the 
pension provider will mean the loss, in whole or part, of the pension 
reserves.11 The effect of political changes on individual pensions seems 
very small.
Financing and Expenditure 
Financing
Statutory pension plans. All employees and self-employed per-
sons in Belgium pay compulsory contributions for the statutory pension 
plans. Contributions for employees are just over 16 percent of gross 
salary. Self-employed persons pay much less.12 General government 
revenues subsidize approximately 10 percent of annual costs (Dellis, 
Jousten, and Perelman 2001). 
Occupational pension plans. In occupational pension plans, the 
contribution rate in percentage of annual salary is usually established 
in the plan rules. Most plans are predominantly employer fi nanced with 
contribution rates usually ranging from 0.5 to 1 percent for lower in-
come workers and 4 to 5 percent for higher income workers. The total 
contributions paid in Belgium for occupational pension plans amounted 
to €5.1 billion in 2007. Total occupational pension reserves in Belgium 
amounted to €48.74 billion in 2007.13 
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Individual pension plans. No one knows exactly how important 
individual pension plans are in Belgium because of the previously 
mentioned lack of data for this form of pension accrual. According to 
the Social Policy Centre of the University of Leuven (CeSo), 2.63 mil-
lion residents participated in pension saving or life insurance in 2006. 
The total contributions and premiums paid amounted to €2.1 billion 
(Berghman 2009). However, considerable differences can be found 
depending on whether or not long-term savings linked to mortgage 
loans for investment in real estate are taken into account. As mentioned 
above, similar tax relief applies to the reimbursement of a mortgage 
loan for a dwelling as to the payment of premiums for an individual life 
insurance policy. Therefore, certain researchers classify this form of 
saving as an individual pension. According to Gieselink et al. (2003), 
total premiums and contributions to individual pension plans amounted 
to €10 billion in 2000 (i.e., 4.2 percent of GDP). Following the same 
approach as Gieselink, we calculated that total premiums and contribu-
tions to individual pension plans amounted to €16 billion in 2006 (i.e., 
5.4 percent of GDP).14
Expenditure
To compare the expenditures for the different types of pension 
accrual, Table 7.4 presents an overview of the weight of the various 
pension plans in Belgium from two perspectives. First, pension spend-
ing for the statutory pension plans is compared with pension provisions 
for the occupational and individual pension plans (statutory pensions 
are pay as you go and occupational and individual pensions are funded). 
Second, statutory pension entitlements are compared with occupational 
and individual pension reserves. 
In 2007, statutory pension spending (including prepensions and 
disability allowances) amounted to 10 percent of GDP.15 In the same 
year, occupational pension accrual amounted to 1.52 percent of GDP. 
In 2006, individual pension accrual amounted to 0.66 percent or 5.1 
percent of GDP, depending on whether or not pension accrual linked to 
a mortgage is taken into account. 
In 2007, statutory pension entitlements amounted to 250 percent of 
GDP, and occupational pension reserves amounted to about 14.5 per-
cent of GDP. Individual pension reserves amounted to 45.1 percent of 
The Ideal Pension System for Belgium   163
GDP in 2006 (pension accrual linked to a mortgage was not taken into 
account). No exact data are available concerning the real estate prop-
erty of the elderly, but the macroeconomic wealth of the country is well 
known. It grew from €200 billion in 1970 to €1,300 billion in 2002. Ap-
proximately half of this wealth (€650 billion) is estimated to be linked 
to real estate, mainly dwellings (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010). 
This represented 240 percent of GDP in 2002.
Although the comparison is simplifi ed and exact fi gures are lack-
ing in some categories, the overview gives an idea of the proportion of 
investment in the different forms of pension accrual in Belgium. The 
fi nancial assets invested in statutory pensions are the most important 
(250 percent of GDP in 2007), whereas the fi nancial assets invested in 
occupational pensions are clearly less important (14.5 percent of GDP 
in 2007). The fi nancial assets invested in individual pensions are con-
siderable (45.1 percent of GDP in 2006), even more so if tax-driven 
investments in real estate are taken into account (up to 240 percent of 
GDP in 2002). 
Projections
In 2007, Belgium had 1.8 million residents older than 65. This 
number will increase to 2.2 million in 2020 (i.e., 20.6 percent of the 
total population), 2.65 million in 2030 (24.3 percent), 2.86 million in 
2040 (26.1 percent), and 2.90 million in 2050 (26.5 percent). In 1990, 
for every person older than 65, Belgium had four persons between 20 
and 65. In 2020, for every person older than 65, there will only be three 
persons between 20 and 65. By 2040, this proportion will be two per-
sons between 20 and 65 for every person older than 65.16
Projections of the impact of demographic changes on pension 
spending are only available for statutory pensions. There are no pro-
jections for occupational and individual pensions because they are not 
mandatory (except for a few branches of industry, where an industry-
wide plan is installed). Table 7.5 presents the results of projections for 
expenditure for statutory pensions, as well as an estimate of the tax 
incomes on statutory pensions, both expressed as percentage of GDP.
Expenditure for statutory pensions increases by 3.9 percent of GDP 
between 2007 and 2030. Then, between 2030 and 2060, pension expen-
diture is projected to increase by another 0.8 percent of GDP. Employee 
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Pension spending/provisionsb Pension entitlements/reserves Plan members
€ billion % GDP € billion % GDP Number %
Statutory 
pensions









4.13 1.23 NA NA 1,794,728 43% of 
employees











16.00h 5.10 NA NA NA NA
Individual 
life insurance





1.20 0.35 NA NA 1,859,000 26.4% of 
population 
aged 15–64
Table 7.4  Relative Weight of the Various Pensions in 2007 (2006 for Individual Pension Plans)a
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NOTE: NA = not available. 
a In 2007 in Belgium, GDP was €335 billion, total population was 10,584,534, total population between 15 and 64 years of age was 
7,046,685, and the active population (people working plus people searching for a job) was 4,681,394. The activity rate (i.e. percentage 
of working population plus the unemployed) was 67.1 percent. In 2006 Belgian GDP was equal to €316 billion.
b More recent fi gures concerning costs of the statutory pensions in Belgium are available. In 2010 the total costs of statutory pensions 
were €33.7 billion, broken down as follows: civil servants plan, €9.9 billion; employees plan, €18.2 billion; self-employed plan, €2.7 
billion; GIE, €0.4 billion; and others, €2.5 billion (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010, p. 124).
c Belgian Secretary of Pensions (2010).
d Capretta (2007), OECD (2006), and Dellis, Jousten, and Perelman (2001, p. 3).
e Belgian Secretary of Pensions (2010), Hannes (2009), Sommerijns and De Bilderling (2009), and Belgian Parliament (2008–2009).
f Belgian Parliament (2009).
g Berghman (2009).
h Data from the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, analyzed in De Witte, Roels, and Stevens (2009). 
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Projected expenditures 2000 2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 Peak year
Statutory pension plans
Total 10.0 10.0 11.8 13.9 14.6 14.7 14.7 2056
Employee plan 5.1 4.9 5.9 7.1 7.6 7.7 7.7 2057
Self-employed plan 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 2035
Civil servants’ plan 2.9 3.1 4.0 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 2060
GIE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2036
Prepension 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2000
Disability 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 2018
Taxes on statutory pension benefi ts — 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2057
Table 7.5  Projected Gross Statutory Pension Spending (% GDP)
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and civil servant plans are jointly responsible for these increases. The 
other pensions remain stable or decline slightly. Together, the employee 
and the civil servant plans make up 80 percent of the total public pen-
sion expenditure, and this proportion increases to 87 percent in 2060. 
Because of the rising statutory pensions, tax income on these pension 
payments will also increase from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2007 to 2 per-
cent of GDP in 2060.
PENSION REFORM PROPOSALS OF THE MAIN SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL ACTORS
There is a consensus in Belgium with respect to the necessity of a 
pension reform. The main social and political actors refer to two prob-
lems of the Belgian pension system: budgetary sustainability and social 
sustainability. However, no consensus exists with respect to concrete 
pension reform proposals. In fact, very different and opposing ideas 
exist. This section summarizes the reform proposals of the main social 
and political actors.
Federation of Enterprises in Belgium
According to the Federation of Enterprises in Belgium (FEB), the 
insurance character of the statutory pension plan for employees should 
be enforced (FEB 2010). The FEB wants to change three mechanisms 
of the employee plan: 1) the early retirement age,17 2) the capped ben-
efi ts,18 and 3) the so-called free rights.19 The FEB proposes an increase 
in the actual and legal retirement age. To increase the actual retirement 
age, the FEB proposes the valuation of the labor period after the age 
of 60 at a higher rate (115 percent) and the valuation of periods of in-
activity before the age of 60 (unemployment, prepension, etc.) at less 
than 100 percent. The FEB refers to the Swedish pension system, where 
individual accounts within the fi rst pillar were introduced, and rising 
life expectancy has been corrected for by decreasing pension benefi ts. 
According to the FEB, the statutory pension plan for civil servants is 
much too favorable compared to the pension plans of employees (in the 
public and the private sector) and the self-employed. The calculation of 
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the statutory pension for civil servants should be based on the principles 
of the statutory pension for employees. 
According to the FEB, occupational pension plans are necessary 
to increase replacement rates. The FEB proposes the facilitation of oc-
cupational pension accrual by allowing workers to invest more of their 
wages directly into their occupational pension plans. In addition, the 
FEB believes that tax relief for the individual pensions encourages peo-
ple to save, and it should therefore remain unchanged. 
Trade Unions20
According to the trade unions, only statutory pension plans guarantee 
solidarity. Therefore, they should be strengthened. Trade unions claim 
that statutory pension benefi ts for employees are too low. Twenty-fi ve
percent of the current pensioners in Belgium are poor according to 
the European poverty standard (i.e., 60 percent or less of the median 
wage). Increasing the benefi ts for employees with lower incomes is a 
priority for the trade unions. They support increasing the GIE to the 
European poverty standard and the minimum pension to 110 percent of 
the European poverty standard. In addition, the trade unions also want 
to increase statutory pensions for employees with higher incomes. The 
Socialist trade union (FGTB-ABVV) proposes an increase in the statu-
tory employee pension formula, from the current 60 percent of average 
income to 75 percent of average income. The trade unions do not agree 
with an increase in the legal retirement age, which will decrease pen-
sion benefi ts. Finally, the trade unions want automatic adjustment of 
statutory pension benefi ts to the CPI and real wages (for the moment, 
adjustment of statutory pension benefi ts is not automatic and is only 
related to CPI, not to real wage increases).21
To fi nance the extra expenditures, the trade unions propose three 
measures: 1) the so-called General Social Contribution, which is an al-
ternative fi nancing mechanism for the social security system (statutory 
pensions are embedded in this system) that includes social contribution 
on all types of incomes (instead of only labor income); 2) higher social 
security contributions for the self-employed; and 3) a phase-out of the 
tax relief for individual and occupational pension plans.
The trade unions are not opposed to the further development of oc-
cupational pensions, as long as those pensions also benefi t employees 
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with lower incomes.22 The Christian trade union (CSC-ACV) proposes a 
ban on risk-bearing investments in occupational pensions. The Socialist 
trade union proposes the development of more mandated occupational 
pensions with solidarity mechanisms (e.g., pension accrual during un-
employment and illness). With respect to individual pension plans, the 
trade unions are unanimous. They believe that tax relief should be aban-
doned, given the fact that this relief is clearly to the benefi t of higher 
income persons, who do not need these incentives to invest in pensions.
Pensioners
The Advisory Committee for the Pension Sector was created to 
give recommendations with respect to the organization and reform of 
the pension system. This Committee covers about 40 pensioner asso-
ciations in Belgium. The Committee proposes that absolute priority 
must be given to statutory pension plans. The Committee argues for 
a minimum pension equal to the minimum salary and an upgrading of 
the current pension benefi ts. According to the Committee, current pen-
sion benefi ts have lost their purchasing power as a result of inadequate 
CPI adjustments. The extension of the occupational pensions is not a 
solution according to the Committee because these pensions increase 
inequality and insecurity. Moreover, the Committee says that 1 percent 
of salary invested in statutory public pensions provides a higher pen-
sion benefi t than 1 percent of salary invested in occupational pensions.23
In order to fi nance extra expenditures for statutory pensions, the 
Committee proposes the introduction of a wealth tax. Although the 
Committee did not make a concrete proposal, it refers to France where 
such a tax exists. In addition, the Committee proposes a phase-out of 
tax relief for occupational and individual pension plans. 
Government
With an aging population set to put mounting pressure on the bud-
get in the decades ahead, in 2001 the Belgian government created the 
so-called Silver Fund, which is a budgetary trust fund that was supposed 
to cover a portion of future pension costs. The idea was to reduce the 
debt-to-GDP burden in the near term, leaving room for the government 
to run budget defi cits as the population ages and statutory pensions and 
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health care costs rise. The fund was fi nanced by privatization proceeds 
and budget surpluses. The government’s goal was to turn the projected 
budget defi cit of 0.1 percent of GDP in 2001 into a surplus of 0.7 per-
cent of GDP in 2005 and 1.5 percent of GDP in 2010 and thereafter. 
However, these targets were never met. On the contrary, the recent fi -
nancial and economic crisis strongly increased the debt-to-GDP burden, 
and the Silver Fund remains fundamentally empty. 
In 2005, the Belgian government tried to increase the actual retire-
ment age. A new early retirement regulation, the “Generation Pact,” 
was enacted. The results thus far have been limited, however. Currently 
there are no concrete pension reform proposals from the government. 
Within most political parties, a consensus exists about the guidelines 
formulated by the EU in Stockholm in 2001, that is, decrease govern-
ment debt, increase employment and labor productivity, and decrease 
costs of public pension systems and health care. In the Green Paper: A 
Future for our Pensions (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010), the gov-
ernment refers to a series of possible reforms. The following reforms 
focus on the budgetary sustainability of the system: increased retirement 
age, decreased pension benefi ts, decreased tax relief for occupational 
and individual pensions, and increased taxes. In addition, two reforms 
that focus on social sustainability were introduced: increased minimum 
pension benefi ts and increased participation in occupational and indi-
vidual pension plans. Some of these proposals are discussed in the next 
section.
EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS PENSION 
REFORM PROPOSALS
Many different reform options are available, and the choice between 
them is based on ideology and value judgments. To be clear about the 
evaluation criteria used, I fi rst develop a set of evaluation criteria and 
then evaluate the various reform proposals discussed above in terms of 
these criteria. 
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Evaluation Criteria
In this section, four types of pension accrual are defi ned: 1) long-
term savings, 2) private insurance, 3) social insurance, and 4) social 
security. These four types are then distinguished on the basis of their 
intrinsic features, using the following criteria: the degree of redistribu-
tive solidarity, the scope of risk sharing, and the degree of protection of 
pension rights.
Degree of redistributive solidarity
Various forms of pension accrual can be distinguished based on their 
degree of redistributive solidarity. The four degrees of redistributive sol-
idarity are as follows: 1) no redistribution at all, 2) redistribution based 
on “probability-solidarity,” 3) redistribution based on “risk-solidarity,”
and 4) redistribution based on “income-solidarity.” Redistribution 
based on probability-solidarity is present when different persons with 
similar risk profi les are pooled in one group and pay the same pen-
sion contributions or insurance premiums. Redistribution in this group 
is from those who do not actually experience the adverse event (e.g., 
death in the case of survivor’s benefi ts) to those who do, even though 
they all share a similar probability of experiencing it. Redistribution 
based on risk-solidarity is present when different persons with different 
risk profi les are pooled together and pay the same pension contributions 
or insurance premiums. In this system, persons with better risk profi les 
subsidize persons with inferior risk profi les. Redistribution based on 
income-solidarity involves contribution or premium differentiation 
based on income, so that persons with higher incomes pay higher pre-
miums for the same benefi ts. In this system, direct income redistribution 
takes place, independent of risk profi les. The degree of reciprocity in a 
system based on income-solidarity can be higher or lower. If there is no 
link between entitlement to benefi ts and the payment of contributions in 
the past, the degree of reciprocity is nil (e.g., the GIE in Belgium). How-
ever, in many income redistributive systems, there is some connection 
between the entitlement to benefi ts and the payment of contributions 
in the past (e.g., the statutory pension plans in Belgium). Risk- and 
income-solidarity are necessarily linked to a certain degree of manda-
tory membership (Stevens 2002).
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Scope of risk sharing 
Pension accrual often takes place over a period of decades. There-
fore, risk control is a very important issue. As discussed previously, 
there are fi ve primary risks that threaten pension accrual and four scopes 
for distinguishing risk sharing (Table 7.3). 
Degree of protection of pension rights
The protection of pension rights varies for different types of pen-
sion accrual. Protection can be granted on three fi elds: 1) protection 
of investment returns, 2) protection against bankruptcy of the pension 
provider, and 3) protection of the destination as pension (e.g., interdic-
tion of provisions on lump sum payments and early withdrawals). In 
the protection of the investment returns, three options are available: 
no guaranteed investment returns, guaranteed investment returns by 
contract (optional), and guaranteed investment returns by law (manda-
tory). In the protection against bankruptcy of the pension provider, four 
degrees of protection are possible: 1) no protection, 2) liability of the 
sponsor for the payment of the pension benefi ts, 3) pension protection 
funds, and 4) state guarantees. In the protection of the destination as 
pension, three degrees of protection can be distinguished: no prohibi-
tion of payout before pensionable age and no prohibition of payout as a 
lump sum after pensionable age; prohibition of payout before pension-
able age, but no prohibition of payout as a lump sum after pensionable 
age; and prohibition of payout before pensionable age and obligation of 
payout as an annuity after pensionable age. 
Four types of pension accrual
Based on the above-mentioned features, we defi ned four types of 
pension accrual. These types are prototypes, which do not necessarily 
correspond to real forms of pension accrual in Belgium or other coun-
tries. We named these types long-term savings, private insurance, social 
insurance, and social security. Long-term savings is a type of pension 
accrual without any form of redistributive solidarity, no risk sharing, 
and no protection of pension rights. Private insurance is a type of pen-
sion accrual with redistributive effects based on probability-solidarity, 
risk sharing at the company level, and limited protection of pension 
rights. Social insurance is a type of pension accrual with redistributive 
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effects based on risk-solidarity, risk sharing at branch of industry level, 
and heavy protection of pension rights. Social security, fi nally, is a type 
of pension accrual with income-redistributive effects, nationwide risk 
sharing, and heavy protection of pension rights. A schematic overview 
of the distinguishing criteria of these four types of pension accrual is 
shown in Table 7.6. 
The various forms of actual pension accrual in Belgium are eval-
uated in Appendix 7A with respect to their degree of redistributive 
solidarity, scope of risk sharing, and degree of protection of pension 
rights. The results of this evaluation are reordered in Table 7.7 to show 
the various forms of pension accrual in Belgium relative to accrual pro-
totype. The table shows some interesting results. First, it shows that no 
form of actual pension accrual in Belgium corresponds entirely to one 
prototype. Each form of pension accrual presents features of different 
prototypes of pension accrual.
The individual pension plans are entirely based on the long-term 
savings and private insurance prototypes. Their degree of redistributive 
solidarity, risk sharing, and protection of pension rights is very low.
 The occupational pensions, except for social industry-wide plans, 
also show many similarities with the long-term savings and private in-
surance types of pension accrual. This is remarkable, given the fact that 
occupational pensions are often referred to in Belgium as social insur-
ance systems. The only social insurance features of the occupational 
pension plans are the risk-solidarity in defi ned benefi t survivor’s pen-
sions and social industry-wide pensions, the sharing of bankruptcy and 
fi nancial risks at the branch of industry level for industry-wide plans 
(longevity and infl ation risk are not shared, see Table 7A.1), and the 
liability of the sponsor in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider. 
Moreover, a social security feature is present—the mandatory guaran-
teed investment return.
As might be expected, the statutory pension plans have the most 
properties of social security, and the GIE is clearly social security 
because income redistributive solidarity, without any reciprocity, is 
present (the entitlement to GIE benefi ts is not linked to the payment of 
contributions in the past). For the other statutory pensions, a certain de-
gree of reciprocity is present (benefi ts are calculated based on earnings 
in the past). This is a social insurance character of the statutory pension 
plans for employees, civil servants, and the self-employed. However, 
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Type of pension accrual Features
Long-term savings 1) No redistributive solidarity
2) No risk sharing
3) No protection of pension rights
 No guaranteed investment returns
 No protection against bankruptcy of the pension provider
 Payment of pension benefi ts as a lump sum at any moment in time 
Private insurance 1) Redistributive effects based on probability-solidarity
2) Risk sharing at company level
3) Small protection of pension rights
 Guaranteed investment returns by contract (optional)
 No protection against bankruptcy of the pension provider
 Payment of pension benefi ts as a lump sum at the date in the insurance contract
Social insurance 1) Redistributive effects based on risk-solidarity 
2) Risk sharing at branch of industry level
3) Medium protection of  pension rights
 Guaranteed investment returns by contract (optional)
 Liability of the sponsor in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider
 Payment of pension benefi ts in the form of an annuity at retirement age
Table 7.6  Four Types of Pension Accrual
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Social security 1) Income-redistributive effects 
2) Nationwide risk sharing 
3) High protection of pension rights
 Guaranteed investment returns by law (mandatory)
 Pension protection funds or state guarantee in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider
 Payment of pension benefi ts in the form of an annuity after retirement 
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the social insurance character is limited—persons with higher incomes 
pay higher contributions for, at a certain level, equal benefi ts. The risk 
sharing within statutory pensions is nationwide, and the protection of 
pension benefi ts is very high.
The classifi cation of the various forms of pension accrual in Bel-
gium, according to their intrinsic characteristics, allows us to evaluate 
the different reform proposals according to the type of pension accrual 
they promote.
Evaluation of Reform Proposals
When evaluating each proposal, I also briefl y explain the type of 
reform (parametric or structural),24 the aim (budgetary or social sustain-
ability), and the cost bearer (government, employers, or employees). 
Changing tax relief for occupational and individual pensions
Occupational and individual pensions in Belgium are strongly 
tax driven. A decrease in the tax relief for occupational and individ-
ual pensions is a parametric reform aimed to improve the budgetary 
sustainability of the Belgian pension system. If implemented, it would 
probably decrease the proportion of this kind of pension accrual 
within the Belgium pension system. An increase of the tax relief for 
occupational and individual pensions is a parametric reform aimed 
at improving the social sustainability of the pension system. It would 
probably increase the proportion of this type of pension accrual within 
the Belgium pension system.
As shown above, individual and occupational pensions are mainly 
based on the long-term savings and private insurance prototypes (except 
for the social industry-wide plans). A decrease or increase of individual 
and occupational pensions will respectively decrease or increase the 
proportion of long-term savings and private insurance within the Bel-
gian pension system.
Increased retirement age
An increase of the retirement age can take place within statutory 
pensions, occupational pensions, and individual pensions. However, it 
will most likely occur primarily within statutory pensions. The increase 
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in the retirement age can be achieved by increasing the legal retirement 
age or the career length required to obtain full benefi ts. Increasing the 
statutory retirement age is a parametric pension reform aimed at im-
proving the budgetary sustainability of the pension system. This reform 
is at the expense of employees, civil servants, and the self-employed 
who, in one way or another, will have to work longer for the same statu-
tory pension benefi ts or receive lower benefi ts.
Statutory pensions in Belgium are closest to the social security type 
of pension accrual. An increase in retirement age would mean that the 
proportion of this type of pension accrual within the Belgium pension 
system would decrease.
Increased minimum benefi ts of statutory pensions
An increase of the minimum benefi ts of statutory pensions (the GIE 
and minimum pension for employees and the self-employed) is a para-
metric pension reform aimed at improving the social sustainability of 
the pension system. Initially, this reform will be at the expense of the 
government, which will most probably recoup the increased expendi-
tures from taxpayers or decrease other statutory pension benefi ts.
If the increase in minimum benefi ts of statutory pensions is com-
pensated for by a decrease in other statutory pension benefi ts, the 
proportion of the social insurance type of pension accrual in Belgium 
would probably decrease in comparison with the social security type. 
If the increase is fi nanced with increased taxes, the proportion of social 
insurance and social security types of pension accrual would increase. 
Increased statutory pension benefi ts via a wealth tax
The Advisory Committee for the Pension Sector proposes an in-
crease in statutory pensions by means of a wealth tax. The fi nancing 
of statutory pensions by means of a wealth tax is a structural pension 
reform aimed at both the budgetary and social sustainability of the pen-
sion system. This reform is at the expense of the wealthiest citizens. 
To the extent that the extra tax revenues are used to strengthen the 
statutory pension plans in Belgium, the proportion of social insurance 
and social security types of pension accrual would increase within the 
Belgian pension system.
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THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM FOR BELGIUM
The Current Main Problem
The benefi ts of the statutory pension plans are considered too low 
for employees and the self-employed. Occupational pensions cover 
only 60 percent of employees, and the benefi ts are too low, except for 
higher income persons. Individual pensions cover 37 percent of Belgian 
residents (15–64 years old), and their total reserves amounted to 45.1 
percent of GDP in 2007. This percentage is even higher if tax-driven 
investments in real estate are taken into account. The main problem of 
the Belgian pension system at present is not the total amount of invest-
ment in pension accrual. The main problem is the large proportion of 
investment in the long-term savings and private insurance prototypes. 
The degree of redistributive solidarity, the scope of risk sharing, and 
the protection of pension rights associated with these types of pension 
accrual are very low. As a consequence, groups with weak bargaining 
power (lower income workers, women, and those with atypical careers) 
are not covered or are inadequately covered. The question we have to 
ask, then, is which types of pension accrual do we want to promote in 
the future? 
Pensions as Social Goods 
In public economics, a distinction is made between three types of 
goods: public, private, and social. A public good is defi ned as a good 
that is non-rivaled and non-excludable. This means that consumption 
of the good by one individual does not reduce the amount of the good 
available for consumption by others and that no one can be effectively 
excluded from it (e.g., clean air, national defense, or public fi reworks). 
A private good is the opposite of a public good. It is excludable, for 
example, to those who have not paid for it, and consumption by one 
consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers. A 
social good is a private good for which consumption is stimulated by the 
government for various reasons, including social policy. A government 
decides that individuals should have a particular social good based on 
a norm other than responding just to consumer preferences. This norm 
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could be the public interest, common well-being, or general welfare. 
A social good would be under-consumed in a free market economy. 
Because of its positive externalities, the government stimulates con-
sumption through social policy measures.25 Pensions can be considered 
to be social goods insofar as they meet two conditions: 1) they have to 
show a certain degree of solidarity, risk sharing, and protection, and 2) 
they may not exceed a certain percentage of fi nal salary.
The Ideal Pension System for Belgium 
I have shown that individual and occupational pension plans in 
Belgium (except for social industry-wide plans) mainly show char-
acteristics of long-term savings and private insurance. They lack the 
necessary degree of solidarity, risk sharing, and protection of pension 
rights to qualify as pensions. If these pension plans are to maintain their 
tax incentives, they need to integrate more features of social insurance, 
for example, mandatory payment of annuities instead of lump sums, 
continued pension accrual during periods of illness or unemployment, 
risk sharing at the branch of industry level, and protection of pension 
rights in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider. Moreover, once 
a certain accumulated sum of total pension provisions is reached,26 no 
more tax incentives for individual and occupational pensions should be 
allowed. In an ideal pension system for Belgium, the statutory pensions 
would guarantee bene fi ts of 60 percent of fi nal salary. The individual 
and occupational pensions would cover the difference up to 75 percent 
of fi nal salary. No tax incentives would be granted for pension provision 
above 75 percent of fi nal salary. Individual and occupational pensions 
still would have an important role, but tax incentives would only be 
granted if minimum degrees of solidarity, risk sharing, and protection 
of pension rights are met. 
Type of Welfare Regime 
The underlying ideological matter with respect to the ideal pension 
system of a country is to what extent the government is responsible 
for the retirement income of individuals. Three different types of wel-
fare regimes can be distinguished: the liberal, the conservative, and the 
social democratic (Esping-Andersen 1990). In the liberal welfare re-
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gime, the pension system increases inequality. The limits of welfare 
equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. En-
titlement rules are strict and often associated with stigma. Benefi ts are 
modest. The government encourages the market, either by guaranteeing 
only a minimum benefi t or by subsidizing private welfare plans. In the 
conservative welfare regime, the pension system preserves inequality. 
The redistributive impact of the pension system is negligible. Social 
insurance typically excludes nonworking wives. The principle of sub-
sidiarity serves to emphasize that the government will only interfere 
when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted. In the 
social democratic welfare regime, fi nally, the pension system decreases 
inequality. The government pursues an equality of the highest standards, 
not an equality of minimal needs. This implies, fi rst, that services and 
benefi ts will be upgraded to levels commensurate with benefi ts of the 
middle classes. And, second, that equality is furnished by guaranteeing 
workers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better-
off. The Belgian pension system clearly shows characteristics of the 
conservative regime. An ideal pension system for Belgium should show 
more characteristics of a social-democratic welfare regime.
Appendix 7A
Main Features of the
Different Forms of Pension
Accrual in Belgium
In this Appendix, I briefl y evaluate the different forms of pension accrual 
in Belgium with respect to their degree of redistributive solidarity, risk shar-
ing, and protection of pension rights. The different forms of pension accrual 
in Belgium are individual pension plans (pension saving and individual life 
insurance), occupational pension plans (defi ned benefi t or defi ned contribution 
plans at the company level, defi ned contribution plans at the industry level, and 
social industry-wide defi ned contribution plans), and statutory pension plans 
(social security pensions and guaranteed income for the elderly). An overview 
of the evaluation is presented in Table 7A.1. 
Individual Pension Plans 
Pension saving in individual pension plans includes no redistributive sol-
idarity, no risk sharing, and little protection of pension rights. In Belgium, 
the clear distinction between fi nancial institutions and insurance companies 
or between long-term savings and private insurance has disappeared (special-
ists often speak of the “bancassurance” as the phenomenon where banks and 
insurance companies both offer products linked to savings and insurance). 
Consequently, pension saving in a bank is often linked to insurance products. A 
guaranteed investment return can be agreed upon. Moreover, the fi rst €100,000 
of pension savings in a bank account is covered by a state guarantee. Indi-
vidual life insurance as a form of individual pension includes no redistributive 
solidarity with respect to old-age pension accrual. With respect to survivor’s 
pensions, a redistribution based on probability-solidarity is present. Private in-
surance includes no risk-sharing whatsoever. With respect to the protection of 
pension rights, a guaranteed investment return is granted by contract (through 
the insurance mechanism), and pension benefi ts are paid at the date agreed 
upon in the insurance contract (early surrender of the policy may be possible). 
Occupational Pension Plans
With respect to occupational pensions, defi ned contribution plans at the 
company level include no redistributive solidarity and no sharing of risks linked 
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to longevity and infl ation. The risks linked to fi nancial markets and bankruptcy 
are shared at the company level. A medium protection of pension rights is pres-
ent—there is a guaranteed investment return by law, liability of the sponsor in 
case of bankruptcy of the pension provider, and no payment of pension benefi ts 
before retirement age (early withdrawal of pension benefi ts is possible for the 
purchase or renovation of a plan member’s own dwelling). Defi ned benefi t 
plans at the company level include no redistributive solidarity with respect to 
old-age pensions. With respect to survivor’s pensions, a redistribution based on 
risk solidarity is present (people with different risk profi les are pooled together 
in one group). The risk of longevity is not shared within defi ned benefi t plans 
at the company level. The risks linked to infl ation, fi nancial markets, and bank-
ruptcy of the pension provider are shared at the company level. As for defi ned 
contribution plans, a medium protection of pension rights is present (because 
the issue is not applicable to defi ned benefi t plans, a guaranteed investment 
return is provided by law only for defi ned contribution plans). Industry-wide 
plans include no redistributive solidarity and no sharing of the risks linked to 
longevity and infl ation. Risks linked to fi nancial markets and bankruptcy are 
shared at the industry level. The same protection of pension rights applies for 
both defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plans at the company level. The 
social industry-wide plans differ from standard industry-wide plans only with 
respect to their degree of redistributive solidarity. Membership in these plans 
is mandatory and people with different risk profi les are pooled together. In case 
of illness, employment, pregnancy, and other circumstances, pension accrual 
continues, and therefore, redistribution based on risk solidarity is present (for 
old-age and survivor’s pensions). 
Statutory Pension Plans
Social security pensions include income-solidarity, nationwide risk 
sharing, and full protection of pension rights. The difference between social 
security pensions and the GIE is the degree of reciprocity within the income 
solidarity. For the GIE there is no link between entitlement to benefi ts and pay-
ment of contributions in the past. For social security pensions, there is some 
proportional connection between the entitlement to benefi ts and the payment 
of contributions in the past.
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Table 7A.1  Evaluation of the Different Forms of Pension Accrual in Belgium
(continued)
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Criteria to evaluate pension accrual
Individual 































No risk sharing X X
Company X X





No risk sharing X X
Company X X
























No protection X X
Liability of the 
sponsor X X X X
Pension protection 
funds or state X X X
Table 7A.1 (continued)
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No protection X X
Liability of the 
sponsor X X X X
Pension protection 







Payment of pension 
benefi ts as a lump 
sum at any moment 
in time
X
Payment of pension 
benefi ts as a lump 
sum on date in 
contract 
X X X X X
Payment of pension 
benefi ts in the form 
of an annuity at 
pensionable age
Payment of pension 
benefi ts in the form 
of an annuity after 
retirement
X X
NOTE: DB: defi ned benefi t; DC: defi ned contribution; R: with a certain degree of reciprocity; NR: no reciprocity.
aThere is no survivor’s pension linked to the GIE.
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Notes
1. For example, a single person who worked 35 years will receive an annuity equal to 
35/45 × average (capped) earnings × 60 percent. A married person with a depen-
dent spouse who worked 40 years will receive an annuity equal to 40/45 × average 
(capped) earnings × 75 percent. In 2008, the wage of 20.1 percent of full-time 
private sector employees was higher than the wage ceiling (Belgian Secretary of 
Pension 2010, p. 127).
2. It is possible to retire at the age of 60, provided the person had a minimum career 
length of 35 years. To stimulate employees to work until the age of 65, a pension 
bonus has been granted for each working day after the age of 62 or after a career 
of 44 years. After retirement a person may continue to work, although his or her 
pension may be adjusted (i.e., reduced) for earnings above certain levels.
3. The calculation of penalties in case of early retirement (before 65) and the absence 
of a minimum claim per year are examples of the differences. Legal retirement 
age, the pension bonus, price indexation, and the survivor’s pension are similar to 
the employee plan.
4. Civil servants who have been declared permanently unfi t to continue their careers, 
regardless of their age or seniority, are entitled to a disability pension.
5. New legislation has severely restricted internal funding via book reserves.
6. Belgium has an elaborate network of collective negotiation bodies. In labor mat-
ters, employee representatives and employer representative bodies meet at different 
levels to discuss collective measures. The National Labor Council supervises 200 
joint committees, organized by industry type. Therefore, for the companies in a 
particular industry, there is a body of representatives of both employers and em-
ployees that meets to conclude binding collective bargaining agreements or more 
politically engaging social agreements.
7. According to the OECD, tax incentives for occupational pension plans cannot be 
preserved because they mainly benefi t higher income workers, who have already 
enough savings for their retirement (OECD 2007, 2009).
8. The maximum statutory pension benefi t for a single person who has been an em-
ployee during his entire career is €1,800 per month (€2,200 for married persons 
with a dependent spouse). The maximum is €1,000 per month for a single person 
who has been self-employed during his entire career (€1,200 for married self-
employed persons with a dependent spouse). 
9. The replacement rate is the fraction of previous salary that the statutory pension 
benefi ts replace. In order to calculate these rates, previous gross salary (or the 
average of the 5 last years of net income of self-employed) is compared with gross 
statutory pension benefi ts, including holiday pay and other supplements.
10. Industry-wide plans in Belgium are always defi ned contribution plans.
11. Insurance companies can purchase a state guarantee for the fi rst €100,000 of indi-
vidual pension reserves (Royal Decree of November 14, 2008).
12. Statutory pensions are embedded in the social security system. The social security 
contributions for the self-employed are capped. The self-employed pay a maxi-
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mum of €3,664.49 per quarter (in 2009). This amount corresponds to 22 percent 
of the income up to €51,059.94 and 14.16 percent of the income above that up to 
the cap of €75,246.19. This system restricts redistributive solidarity because a self-
employed person with a net income of, for example, €80,000 pays the same social 
security contributions as one with a net income of €300,000. Employees pay social 
security contributions on their entire salary.
13. About 80 percent of occupational pensions are managed by insurance companies 
and about 20 percent are managed by pension funds (Hannes 2009; Sommerijns 
and De Bilderling 2009).
14. These estimates are based on data from the Banking, Finance, and Insurance Com-
mission. The accumulated reserves for voluntary pensions for the self-employed 
are very limited—they amounted to €28 million in 1996 and €72 million in 2000 
(Gieselink et al. 2003).
15. Half of total spending goes to the employee plan (4.9 percent of GDP), and one-
third goes to the civil servants plan (3.1 percent of GDP). The rest goes to disability 
pensions (0.8 percent of GDP), the self-employed plan (0.7 percent of GDP), pre-
pensions (0.4 percent of GDP), and the GIE (0.1 percent of GDP).
16. This demographic evolution is mainly present in the Flemish region in Belgium.
17. The average retirement age is 59.5 years for men and 58.2 years for women.
18. Statutory pension contributions are calculated on the entire salary, whereas the 
benefi ts of statutory pensions are capped, taking into account a maximum salary 
of €47,282  (2009). The FEB proposes the introduction of more earnings-related 
benefi ts.
19. According to the FEB, one-third of statutory pension benefi ts are attributed with-
out any social security contribution of the benefi ciary.
20. Trade unions play a very important role in Belgium. Seventy-fi ve percent of em-
ployees and civil servants are members of a trade union. The two major unions 
are the Christian trade union (CSC-ACV) and the Socialist trade union (FGTB-
ABVV). The third major union is the Liberal trade union (ACLVB-CGSLB), 
which is much smaller. The pension reform proposal of each union can be found 
on their websites.
21. According to the trade unions, one reason for low pension benefi ts in Belgium lies 
in the indexation rules used to calculate initial benefi ts. In the Belgian benefi t for-
mula, wage histories are brought forward for averaging adjusted for prices rather 
than wage growth, the latter being the usual practice in most countries. This provi-
sion has the effect of gradually reducing per capita benefi ts relative to per capita 
wages over time.
22. According to the trade unions, only 2 percent of the employees with the lowest 
statutory pensions benefi t from an occupational pension as compared to 36 percent 
of the employees with the highest statutory pensions. 
23. A study at the University of Leuven, ordered by the Christian trade union, shows 
that the return or effi ciency of statutory public pensions is higher than the return of 
occupational and individual pensions, as a result of the considerable administra-
tion costs of the latter (Pacolet and Strengs 2009).
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24. Structural pension reforms are reforms that change essential features of the pen-
sion system, for example, the transformation from pay as you go to a funded plan, 
from defi ned benefi t to defi ned contribution plans, or from average salary to fi -
nal salary plans. Parametric pension reforms are reforms that change the value of 
certain parameters, for example, career length, minimum pension, or the defi ned 
benefi t percentage. However, some parametric reforms lead to structural changes 
in the overall pension system. For example, the further development of occupa-
tional and individual pensions will also lead to a change in the proportion between 
funded and pay-as-you-go fi nancing. Obviously, the weight of funded pensions 
would increase in this situation.
25. Musgrave (1957) introduced the concept of a merit good, but I prefer the notion 
social good, which is used here. According to Musgrave, different rationales can 
be found for the existence of merit goods. There may be more acceptance for 
income redistribution in the form of goods, rather than purchasing power. Con-
sumption of merit goods needs to be stimulated because when consumed, a merit 
good creates positive externalities (there is a divergence between private benefi t 
and public benefi t and most consumers only take into account private benefi t) and 
most individuals are short-term utility maximizers and so do not take into account 
the long-term benefi ts of consuming a merit good. Examples of merit goods in-
clude education, subsidized housing, and health care.
26. That is, an accumulated sum of statutory pension, occupational pension, and indi-
vidual pension.
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